Madsen v. Women\u27s Health Center, Inc.: Striking an Unequal Balance Between the Right of Women to Obtain an Abortion and the Right of Pro-Life Groups to Freedom of Expression by Osaki, Keli N.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 24 | Issue 1 Article 6
12-15-1996
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.: Striking an
Unequal Balance Between the Right of Women to
Obtain an Abortion and the Right of Pro-Life
Groups to Freedom of Expression
Keli N. Osaki
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the First Amendment Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Women
Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Keli N. Osaki Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.: Striking an Unequal Balance Between the Right of Women to Obtain an Abortion and
the Right of Pro-Life Groups to Freedom of Expression, 24 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (1997)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol24/iss1/6
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.:
Striking an Unequal Balance Between the Right of
Women to Obtain an Abortion and the Right of
Pro-Life Groups to Freedom of Expression
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, certain pro-life organizations have been engaging in
increasingly more aggressive tactics' to promote their anti-abortion
message.' As a result, the media has portrayed anti-abortion protesters
as a whole as overzealous, fanatic individuals who chain themselves to
the doors of abortion clinics, stalk abortion clinic doctors and staff
members, and harass potential and current patients of abortion clinics
by engaging in "sidewalk counseling"3 and distributing graphic litera-
1. A great number of abortion clinics have recently been besieged with firebombs,
death threats, and shootings. A survey by a Washington feminist group reported that
more than half of all abortion clinics in the nation encountered at least one act of
violence during 1994. Rene Sanchez, From Year of Promise to Year of Violence;
Abortion Rights Advocates Decry Trend Toward Militant Opposition, WASH. PosT,
Dec. 31, 1994, at A14. Some examples of these violent acts include John C. Salvi IlI,
who the police arrested for the killing of two abortion clinic workers and wounding
of five other people in Massachusetts. Eric L. Wee, Clinic Slaying Suspect Caught
Shooting at Norfolk Abortion Center Tied to Massachusetts Attacks, WASH. POST, Jan.
1, 1995, at Al. Paul Hill, a former preacher, murdered a doctor and the doctor's
unarmed escort at an abortion clinic in Pensacola, Florida. William Booth, Abortion
Clinic Slayer Is Sentenced to Death, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1994, at Al. At an abortion
clinic in South Bend, Indiana, a perpetrator damaged the roof with an ax, shattered
windows with gunfire, and sent numerous death threats to a clinic doctor. Laurie
Goodstein & Pierre Thomas, Clinic Killings Follow Years of Antiabortion Violence,
WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1995, at Al. That same clinic was shut down for seven and
one-half weeks when someone flooded the clinic's entryway with water and poured in
butyric acid, creating a smell of vomit and feces. Id.
2. The Court established the right to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). The holding in Roe evolved from the Supreme Court's decisions in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that "the right of priva-
cy . . . is a legitimate one"), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (hold-
ing that "[ilf the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual ...
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child").
3. Sidewalk counseling usually involves an anti-abortion protester approaching
ture.4 Notwithstanding the media's portrayal of pro-life groups, and
regardless of how wrong anti-abortion views may seem to the majority
of the population, anti-abortionists still possess the fundamental right to
freedom of speech and expression protected by the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.5
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc.' has limited, however, this fundamental right by imposing
a thirty-six foot buffer zone.7 In the past, the Supreme Court has stated
that "public-issue picketing [is] 'an exercise of ... basic constitutional
rights in their most pristine and classic form,' [and] has always rested
on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values."' Fur-
thermore, the Court has emphasized that "[t]he maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government
may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be
obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of
the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."9
Yet the Supreme Court in Madsen seems to have forgotten these propo-
sitions it stated so eloquently in Carey v. Brown," Edward v. South
Carolina," and Stromberg v. California.'2
This Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in Madsen and
suggests that the Court employed the wrong standard to determine the
constitutionality of the permanent injunction at issue in Madsen, and
individual women seeking to enter a clinic and attempting to dissuade them from
keeping their medical appointments. See Armes v. City of Philadelphia, 706 F. Supp.
1156, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (involving similar activity by abortion protesters).
4. One major newspaper reporter compared anti-abortion protesters to members
of the Ku Klux Klan stating "[tlhey once came in the night, wearing white hooded
robes and brandishing fiery crosses, proclaiming that God was pro-white and on their
side. Now they come in the morning, wearing suits and carrying incendiary posters,
proclaiming that God is pro-life and on their side." Constance A. Morelia, Clinics
Under Siege, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1993, at A21.
5. This Note in no way attempts to condone or minimize the violent acts that
have occurred against abortion clinics and individuals associated with abortion clinics.
Rather, this Note focuses on the rights of individuals who lawfully wish to spread
their pro-life viewpoint, The Supreme Court, in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989),
suggested that the "bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment . . .is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Id. at 414.
6. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
7. Id. at 2520.
8. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980) (quoting Edwards v. South Caroli-
na, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)).
9. Id. at 467 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
10. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
11. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
12. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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that the entire injunction should have been struck down as violative of
the First Amendment. Part II of this Note surveys the historical devel-
opment of First Amendment standards created by the Court in deter-
mining the constitutionality of restrictions placed on speech. " Part III
discusses both the historical and procedural facts of Madsen." Part IV
analyzes the majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 5 the concur-
ring opinion by Justice Souter,"6 the concurring and dissenting opinion
by Justice Stevens," and the concurring and dissenting opinion by Jus-
tice Scalia. 8 Part V, focusing on the public's reaction, explores the im-
pact of the decision. 9 Finally, Part VI argues that the majority's deci-
sion in Madsen was flawed because it applied the wrong standard in
upholding two provisions of the injunction.0
II. HISiOIcAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."2" The
First Amendment has never been interpreted, however, to provide an
absolute ban against governmental intervention on the right to speak.'
On the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has traditionally
maintained that certain categories of speech deserve little or no First
Amendment protection.' In addition, the Supreme Court has held that
13. See ifra notes 21-58 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 59-88 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 89-171 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 177-203 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 204-61 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 262-72 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 273-78 and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
22. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSrrUIONAL LAW § 16.7(b), at
942-43 (4th ed. 1991).
23. The Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), stated that re-
strictions upon the content of speech have been permitted in a few limited areas
which "are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Id. at 572 (discussing restrictions on "fighting words"); see, e.g., New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957) (obscenity).
certain well-defined and narrowly tailored restrictions may be placed on
speech.24
Generally, when the government restricts freedom of expression, the
speech it limits can be placed into two broad categories.25 First, the
government restricts the speech because of its content or general sub-
ject matter.26 Second, the government restricts the speech only as an
incidental effect of avoiding some evil connected with the content of
the speech.27 The government will generally implement this second
type of restriction either by (1) placing restrictions on an activity which
may convey information or ideas,' or (2) establishing and enforcing
rules which disrupt the flow of information or ideas.'
The appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied by the Court to
speech restrictions depends on whether Congress aimed the regulation
directly at the content of the speech (a content-based restriction) or
indirectly at the incidental effect of the speech (a content-neutral regu-
lation).' The Supreme Court developed this content distinction over
the years as a result of an overabundance of First Amendment challeng-
es.
31
24. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding
municipal noise regulation requiring bandshell performers to use city-provided sound
amplification equipment); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (upholding ordi-
nance prohibiting picketing in front of residences); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 107-08 (1972) (upholding ordinance prohibiting an individual, while on grounds
adjacent to an in-session school, from willfully making a disturbing noise or diver-
sion).
25. LAURENCE H. TmBE, AMERICAN CONSTr1rIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789 (2d ed. 1988).
This Note's section on First Amendment standards speaks in very general terms and
does not purport to discuss every level of analysis the Court has used to determine
the constitutionality of restrictions on speech. For a complete discussion of First
Amendment standards, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm.
L. REV. 46 (1987) and Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amend-
ment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
26. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 12-2, at 789-90. See infra notes 3245 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of content-based restrictions.
27. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 12-2, at 789-90. See infra notes 46-50 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of content-neutral restrictions.
28. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 12-2, at 789-90; see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89
(1949) (upholding a prohibition on the use of loudspeakers in residential areas).
29. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 12-2, at 790; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143-44
(1976) (upholding a ceiling on campaign contributions).
30. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 12-2, at 791-92.
31. The Supreme Court's large body of opinions discussing content-based and con-
tent-neutral distinctions have been the topic of numerous law review articles. See,
e.g., Thomas 1. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL
L. REV. 422 (1980); Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment:
A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Re-
strictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and
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A. First Amendment Standards for Content-based Restrictions
A content-based restriction, as the name indicates, focuses directly at
the subject matter of the speech." The Court applies the highest level
of First Amendment scrutiny to this type of restriction because the
government is restricting the speech based solely on what the speaker
is communicating.' The Court has labeled this analysis the "compel-
ling state interest test."' In order to satisfy this test, the government
must show that regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state in-
terest, and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end; otherwise, the
regulation is unconstitutional.'
For instance, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,) the Court
addressed whether a city ordinance that prohibited picketing within 150
feet of a school, except for peaceful picketing of any school involved in
a labor dispute, could withstand constitutional scrutiny.37 Supporters
of the city ordinance asserted it was a valid time, place, and manner re-
striction.' The Court rejected this argument, however, and explained
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
32. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380-81 (1992) (addressing ordinance
which differentiated between racially based fighting words and fighting words based
on other topics); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 108 (1991) (dealing with statute that required accused or convicted
criminals' income derived from works describing their crimes be made available to
the victims of the crime); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988) (addressing statute
which prohibited signs or displays critical of foreign governments within 500 feet of
embassies).
33. The Court in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), stated that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and the First Amendment prohibit the government from selectively
allowing the use of a forum only by individuals with views it finds acceptable. Id. at
463. Moreover, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the
Court emphasized that "[t]o permit the continued building of our politics and culture,
and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right
to express any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbid-
den censorship is content control." Id. at 95-96.
34. The compelling state interest test is also known as strict scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-22; Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569,
572-73 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
35. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Stated in another manner, the Court in Carey expressed
that content-based legislation must be "finely tailored to serve substantial state inter-
ests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully
scrutinized." Carey, 447 U.S. at 461-62.
36. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
37. Id. at 92-93.
38. Id. at 99. Despite the provision in the statute that permitted labor picketing
that because the ordinance permitted labor related speech but prohibit-
ed all other types of speech, the regulation was content-based." There-
fore, because the government failed to demonstrate a compelling state
interest to support a distinction between labor picketing and other
types of speech,4 ° the Court held that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional.4 ' In striking down the ordinance as in violation of the First
Amendment, the Court in Mosley stated that "[t]he central problem with
Chicago's ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in terms
of its subject matter.... Once a forum is opened up to assembly or
speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say.""
When using the compelling state interest test to determine the consti-
tutionality of restrictions on freedom of speech, the Court withholds a
presumption of constitutionality.' Thus, the state bears the burden of
proving that the regulation serves a compelling state interest, and that it
is the least restrictive means available to promote the state's interest."
This stringent test reflects the Court's disfavor of governmental regula-
tions that suppress certain types of speech without restricting others
and that could lead to a distortion of the content of public debate and a
destruction of society's thought processes.4
within 150 feet of an in-session school involved in a labor dispute, the city argued
that the ordinance was "not improper content censorship, but rather a device for pre-
venting disruption of the school." Id.
39. Id.
40. The city argued that "it may prohibit all nonlabor picketing because, as a
class, nonlabor picketing -is more prone to produce violence than labor picketing." Id.
at 100.
41. Id. at 102. The Court emphasized that their holding in Mosley did not stand
for the proposition that a state could never regulate picketing based on content; rath-
er, the Court stated that the "justifications for selective exclusions from a public fo-
rum must be carefully scrutinized." Id. at 98-99.
42. Id. at 95-96.
43. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530 (1980); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92.
44. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
45. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that re-
strictions placed on expressive activity because of its content would completely un-
dercut the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and. wide-open").
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B. First Amendment Standards for Content-neutral Time, Place, and
Manner Restrictions
While the compelling state interest test is generally applied to con-
tent-based restrictions, the Court usually applies lower levels of judicial
scrutiny to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.46 The
Court employs a lower standard of scrutiny for content-neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions because of the generally accepted propo-
sition that the government does not intend to restrict the speaker's
ideas; rather, it only intends to restrict the manner in which such ideas
may be expressed.4' Thus, content-neutral government restrictions are
less likely than content-based restrictions to damage the thought pro-
cesses within the community or affect the content of public discussion.
The Court has generally used two judicially created standards when
analyzing content-neutral restrictions: the time, place, and manner test
and the incidental regulation test." The time, place, and manner test is
usually stated as a three-part test: (1) the restriction must be content-
neutral; (2) the regulation must be narrowly tailored to "serve a signifi-
cant governmental interest"; and (3) the regulation must "leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information."49
The incidental regulation test is a less rigid, general principle test. Un-
der the incidental regulation test, a content-neutral regulation will be
upheld if
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest' r
46. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294
(1984) (ban prohibiting sleeping in public parks); United States Postal Serv. v.
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131 & n.7 (1981) (statute forbidding depositing
unstamped materials in home mailboxes); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (regulation providing that anyone who
wished to sell or distribute merchandise (including literature) or solicit funds on local
state fairgrounds must do so only from an assigned booth).
47. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688-89 (1985); TRIBE, supra note
25, § 12-2, at 791.
48. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 22, § 16.47, at 1087 (outlining the
methods used by the Court in content-neutral scenarios).
49. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976).
50. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
Under either test, it is important to note that the Court must make an
additional inquiry as to whether the purportedly content-neutral regula-
tion is not in reality an effort to suppress speech based on its content.
For instance, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,5 ' the trial court upheld the constitutionality of a school regula-
tion that forbade students from wearing arnbands.52 In upholding the
regulation, the lower court reasoned that the school policy was a valid
time, place, and manner restriction, and the court of appeals affirmed.'
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court's decision
stating that the school regulation prohibiting the wearing of armbands
was actually a pretext for restricting the content of student speech.'
The Court pointed out that the students who wore armbands in violation
of the school's regulation did so to show their opposition to the United
States involvement in the Vietnam War.' Furthermore, the school dis-
trict had previously permitted students to wear political insignia.' Thus,
the Court concluded the regulation was not consistent with the school's
stated interest in avoiding aggressive or disruptive actions; rather, the
school officials wanted to punish petitioners for expressing a silent, pas-
sive opinion regarding the conflict in Vietnam.57 Hence, the Court held
that the regulation was invalid because it acted as an unconstitutional re-
straint upon the students' right to engage in personal intercommunication
regarding matters of political importance.'
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., a Florida state court, at the:
request of operators of abortion clinics located in central Florida, issued
a permanent injunction prohibiting several anti-abortion groups "from
blocking or interfering with" access to a Florida health clinic.59 The triai
51. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
52. Id. at 504-05.
53. Id. at 505. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision without is-
suing an opinion. Id. The trial court upheld the school's regulation prohibiting
armbands, stating that it was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school
discipline. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
54. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-14.
55. Id. at 510. The Court reasoned that the students' wearing of the armbands was,
"closely akin to 'pure speech'" which the Court has continuously held "is entitled to
comprehensive protection under the First Amendment." Id. at 505-06.
56. Id. at 510. The record demonstrated that the school had previously permitted
students to wear buttons supporting various national political campaigns and even the
Iron Cross, a Nazi symbol. Id.
57. Id. at 514.
58. Id. at 513-14.
59. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2521 (1994).
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court subsequently issued a broader injunction enjoining petitioners from
an extensive range of expressive activities including: blocking public
access to abortion clinics; singing, chanting or yelling "within earshot of
the patients inside the Clinic"; approaching patients within 300 feet of the
entrance to the clinic; and protesting outside the homes of the owners
and employees of the abortion clinic.6°
60. Id. at 2521-22. Specifically, the amended iNunction prohibited petitioners from
engaging in the following activities:
(1) At all times on all days, from entering the premises and property of
the Aware Woman Center for Choice, Inc. Clinic [hereinafter Clinic] located
at the northwest comer of U.S. Highway One and Dixie Way in Melbourne,
Brevard County, Florida.
(2) At all times on all days, from blocking, impeding, inhibiting, or in
any other manner obstructing or interfering with access to, ingress into and
egress from any building or parking lot of the Clinic.
(3) At all times on all days, from congregating, picketing, patrolling,
demonstrating or entering that portion of public right-of-way or private prop-
erty within thirty-six (36) feet of the property line of the Clinic. The 36 foot
buffer on the south side of the Clinic is demarcated by the south edge of
paved surface of Dixie Way. It is the intent of the court that the respondents
may use, subject to other restrictions contained herein, the unpaved portion
(the shoulder) on the south side of Dixie Way ....
(4) During the hours of 7:30 am. through noon, on Mondays through
Saturdays, during surgical procedures and recovery periods, from singing,
chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound
amplification equipment or other sounds or images observable to or within
earshot of the patients inside the Clinic.
(5) At all times on all days, in an area within three-hundred (300) feet
of the Clinic, from physically approaching any person seeking the services of
the Clinic unless such person indicates a desire to communicate by approach-
ing or by inquiring of the respondents. In the event of such invitation, the
respondents may engage in communications consisting of conversation of a
non-threatening nature and by the delivery of literature within the three-hun-
dred (300) foot area but in no event within the 36 foot buffer zone. Should
any individual decline such communication, otherwise known as "sidewalk
counseling", that person shall have the absolute right to leave or walk away
and the respondents shall not accompany such person, encircle, surround,
harass, threaten or physically or verbally abuse those individuals who choose
not to communicate with them.
(6) At all times on all days, from approaching, congregating, picketing,
patrolling, demonstrating or using bullhorns or other sound amplification
equipment within three-hundred (300) feet of the residence of any of the
petitioners' employees, staff, owners or agents, or blocking or attempting to
block, barricade, or in any other manner, temporarily or otherwise, obstruct
the entrances, exits or driveways of the residences of any of the petitioners'
employees, staff owners or agents. The respondents and those acting in con-
The trial court issued this amended permanent injunction after it found
that access to the abortion clinic, where petitioners regularly demonstrat-
ed, was still being impeded despite the grant of the initial injunction."'
Specifically, the court determined that anti-abortion protesters continued
to block access to the clinic by gathering on the street in front of the
clinic and congregating at the edge of the clinic's driveway.' In addi-
tion, the court discovered that anti-abortion activists would endeavor to
"sidewalk counsel[]" occupants of the cars that were forced to slow
down to permit the protesters to move away from the clinic's en-
trance.'
The effects of the daily protests, the court found, were extremely detri-
mental to the well-being of the clinic's patients and staff.' The court
heard testimony from a doctor employed at the abortion clinic which
revealed that patients were being subjected to higher health risks be-
cause of the added stress associated with the protesters' activities.' The
cert with them are prohibited from inhibiting or impeding or attempting to
impede, temporarily or otherwise, the free ingress or egress of persons to
any street that provides the sole access to the street on which those resi-
dences are located.
(7) At all times on all days, from physically abusing, grabbing, intimidat-
ing, harassing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or assaulting persons en-
tering or leaving, working at or using services at the petitioners' Clinic or
trying to gain access to, or leave, any of the homes of owners, staff or pa-
tients of the Clinic....
(8) At all times on all days, from harassing, intimidating or physically
abusing, assaulting or threatening any present or former doctor, health care
professional, or other staff member, employee or volunteer who assists in
providing services at the petitioners' Clinic.
(9) At all times on all days, from encouraging, inciting, or securing other
persons to commit any of the prohibited acts listed herein.
Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 679-80 (Fla. 1993), affd
in part, rev'd in part, Madsen, 114 S. Ct at 2516.
61. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. The initial permanent injunction forbade petitioners,
and those acting in concert with them, from the following:
1. [Tjrespassing on, sitting in, blocldng, impeding or obstructing ingress into
or egress from any facility at which abortions are performed in Brevard and
Seminole County, Florida; 2. physically abusing persons entering, leaving,
working or using any services of any facility at which abortions are per-
formed in Brevard and Seminole County, Florida; and, 3. attempting or direct-
ing others to take any of the actions described in Paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 667 n.4.
62. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
63. Id. The number of protesters gathering at the clinic on any given day varied
from just a few to 400. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The doctor stated that the patients "manifested a higher level of anxiety
and hypertension causing those patients to need a higher level of sedation to undergo
[Vol. 24: 203, 1996] Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.
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patients had to deal with not only the stress of the medical procedure
itself, but also with the protesters outside singing and chanting.6
Following a trial court hearing, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
amended injunction. 7 The First Amendment standard used by the court
was whether the restrictions were "'narrowly-tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.'"' In adopting this mid-level standard of review, the
court rejected petitioners' argument that because the injunction 9 was
aimed at suppressing a specific type of message, pro-life speech, a higher
level of review should be applied."
The Florida Supreme Court conceded that the injunction "operate[d] at
the core of the First Amendment" because it prohibited protest activities
concerning matters of public interest.' The court further recognized
that the forum involved in this case, "public streets, sidewalks, and
rights-of-way," were areas considered to be "traditional public forum." 2
the surgical procedures, thereby increasing the risk associated with such procedures."
Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief at 54).
66. Id. Even clinic employees could not escape the protesters' activities. For in-
stance, the pro-life advocates frequently demonstrated outside the homes of clinic
workers, ringing the doorbells of neighbors, distributing literature and labeling the
clinic employees as murderers. Id.
67. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 675 (Fla 1993),
affd in part, rev'd in part, Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516. Petitioners challenged the
amended injunction on the grounds it violated their rights to freedom of speech,
freedom of association, equal protection, and free exercise of religion. Id. at 669.
68. Id. at 671-72 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
69. Hereinafter, "the injunction" or "the amended injunction" refers to the court or-
der at issue in Madsen. The original permanent injunction issued by the Florida state
court will hereinafter be referred to as "the initial injunction."
70. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 670.
71. Id. at 671.
72. Id. Aside from determining whether the restriction on speech is content-based
or content-neutral, an additional factor courts will consider in determining the appro-
priate level of analysis is where the speech the government is attempting to restrict
takes place. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1988) (holding that
streets are public fora, so strict scrutiny applies); Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, 466 U.S. 789, 814 (1984) (holding that public property is not necessarily a pub-
lic fora); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (1983) (holding that a lower level of scrutiny applies
where public property is a non-public forum). Traditionally, the Supreme Court has
classified the place of expression into two broad categories: public and non-public fo-
rums. A public forum is public property that has historically been used as a gather-
ing spot for purposes of expressive activity. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 (citing streets
and parks as time-honored examples of public fora). A non-public forum, on the
Nevertheless, the court determined that the injunction should be ana-
lyzed under an intermediate standard because the injunction was con-
tent-neutral.73 In supporting this decision, the court noted that the pro-
hibitions mandated by the injunction did not even mention the topic of
abortion; rather, they only addressed the harassing manner petitioners
chose to convey their message.74
Applying the intermediate First Amendment standard, the state court
determined that Florida had significant interests in protecting a woman's
constitutional right to seek an abortion," in "ensuring the public safety
and order, in promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets and
sidewalks, and in protecting property rights of all Florida's citizens."7"
Next, the court addressed whether the injunction was narrowly tai-
lored to serve these significant government interests."7 The court noted
that the trial court found each provision of the injunction "necessary to
counteract specific abuses Operation Rescue fomented after entry of the
permanent injunction nearly six months earlier."" In addition, the court
distinguished the type of communication that petitioners engaged in,
targeted picketing aimed at particular individuals, from the more general
type of communication "that cannot be completely banned in public
places, such as distributing handbills and soliciting."79 Finally, the court
acknowledged that the buffer zone around the clinic and workers' resi-
dences could have been "slightly narrower."' Nevertheless, the court
emphasized that it would not "sit as trier-of-fact and make incremental
changes in the trial court's order."8' Accordingly, the court held the
amended injunction was "sufficiently narrowly tailored to protect signifi-
cant government interests."8
other hand, is public property not particularly linked to expression. See International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706-08 (1992) (holding
that airports are non-public fora, as they have neither traditionally been an area for
public discussion and debate, nor have they been opened by the government to the
public for this purpose).
73. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 671.
74. Id. The court stated the restrictions "address[ed] only the volume, timing, loca-
tion, and violent or harassing nature of Operation Rescue's expressive activity." Id.
75. Id. at 672. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding the constitution-
al right to privacy encompasses a woman's abortion decision).
76. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 672.
77. Id. at 672-73.
78. Id. at 672.
79. Id. at 672-73. The court noted that "[t]he First Amendment permits the govern-
ment to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot
avoid the objectionable speech." Id. at 673 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487
(1988)).
80. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 673.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Shortly before the Florida Supreme Court's opinion was handed down,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit heard a sepa-
rate challenge to the same injunction. The court of appeals refused to
uphold the injunction,' emphasizing that the dispute was a clash "be-
tween an actual prohibition of speech and a potential hinderance to the
free exercise of abortion rights."' In direct contradiction to the Florida
state court, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the restrictions outlined in
the injunction were content-based, and thus, were subject to strict scruti-
ny analysis.' The court asserted that the restriction directed against pe-
titioners, all pro-life supporters, was "no more viewpoint-neutral than one
restricting the speech of 'the Republican Party, the state Republican
Party, George Bush, Bob Dole, Jack Kemp and all persons acting in con-
cert or participation with them or on their behalf.'"87 In light of the con-
flict between the Florida Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine
whether protestors demonstrating within a certain proximity to an abor-
tion clinic violates the First Amendment.'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
In a 6-3 decision,' the majority of the Court upheld two of the provi-
sions of the amended injunction: the-buffer zone of thirty-six feet and the
restrictions against loud noises during operating hours.9 The Court stat-
ed that these provisions did not violate the First Amendment rights of
83. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993).
84. Id. at 715.
85. Id. at 711.
86. Id. at 710.
87. Id. at 711. The court deduced that the "acting in concert" provision would
result in arrests of only pro-life activists. Id. The injunction did not restrict the man-
ner in which pro-choice activists could protest. Id.
88. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 907 (1994).
89. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined, and Justice Stevens joined in part Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2520 (1994). Justice Souter filed a concur-
ring opinion. Id. at 2530 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Stevens filed an opinion
concurring and dissenting in part. Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 2534 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
90. Id. at 2527-30.
anti-abortion protesters." The remaining restrictions, however, were
struck down by the Court as violating the First Amendment.'2
The majority began its analysis by addressing petitioners' argument
that the constitutionality of the injunction should be analyzed under a
strict scrutiny standard.93 Petitioners asserted that because the in-
junction only prohibited activities of protestors who shared the pro-life
viewpoint, it was content-based, and thus, should be subject to the high-
est level of scrutiny.' Respondents, on the other hand, argued that the
constitutionality of the injunction should be determined under the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard, a standard that is generally applied to con-
tent-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. 5 The Chief
Justice quickly dismissed both petitioners' and respondents' assertions
regarding the proper First Amendment standard of review.'
The Court explained that if it were to agree with petitioners' assertion
that the injunction was content-based simply because it was directed at
individuals who share the same anti-abortion viewpoint, "virtually every
injunction [would be classified] as content or viewpoint based."97 To the
contrary, the majority stated that not all injunctions are content-based;
rather, injunctions are inherently applicable to only a particular group or
individual, and are issued to regulate the group's speech or activities or
both.' The Court asserted that the reason the injunction focused only
on those parties who shared an anti-abortion viewpoint was because of a
lack of activity by other protest groups, such as pro-choice organiza-
91. Id. at 2530.
92. Id. The Court found these remaining provisions too expansive to affect the
purpose of the injunction. Id.
93. Id. at 2523. For a discussion of the strict scrutiny standard see supra notes
33-45 and accompanying text.
94. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (stating that "[flor the state to enforce a content-based
exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end").
95. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). For a discussion of content-neutral standards see supra notes
46-58 and accompanying text.
96. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523-24.
97. Id. at 2523.
98. Id. The Court explained injunctions are based on the group's past behavior in
the context of the conflict between the parties. Id. Thus, the courts' obligation is to
issue injunctions to devise a remedy for a specific deprivation, not to draft a statute
addressed to the general public. Id.
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tions.99 Accordingly, the majority concluded that the injunction was con-
tent-neutral. '"
The majority next considered whether the content-neutral irjunction
could be analyzed under an intermediate standard of review as urged by
respondents.'' The Court stated that if the 'injunction issued against
petitioners was instead a content-neutral statute, then the intermediate
standard of review would be appropriate.' 2 The majority emphasized
that content-neutral injunctions, however, are not comparable to content-
neutral statutes." The Court noted that while ordinances are drafted
by the legislature and aimed at society in general in order to promote
99. Id. The Court emphasized that there was nothing in the record indicating that
similar conduct aimed at activity unrelated to abortion would receive less restrictive
treatment under Florida law. Id.
The Court further commented that although the petitioners all shared the same
beliefs regarding abortion, this was not determinative that "some invidious content or
view-point based purpose motivated the issuance of the order." Id. at 2524. The
Court reasoned that an injunction is not conclusively content-based merely because it
addresses particular individuals with the same beliefs. Madsen, 114 S. CL at 2524
(citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)).
100. Id. In reaching its decision that the injunction was content-neutral, the Court
also relied on various well-settled First Amendment principles. For instance, in Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), the Court stated that the main focus in
ascertaining content-neutrality is whether a state has imposed a restriction on speech
without regard to the content of the restricted speech. Id. at 791. The Court in Ward
emphasized that in order for a regulation to be considered content-neutral, the gov-
ernment must not have imposed the regulation for the purpose of suppressing unpop-
ular speech. Id.
In applying the principle stated in Ward to the present case, the Madsen Court
reasoned that the lower court imposed restrictions on petitioners' activities, not be-
cause of their anti-abortion message, but rather because petitioners continuously re-
fused to comply with the original order issued by the court. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at
2523-24. But see id. at 2537, 2545-48 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that there was no evidence presented to the trial
court demonstrating petitioners had failed to comply with the original order).
101. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
102. Id.; see Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. The Court stated
[o]ur cases make clear . . . that even in a public forum the government may
impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided the restrictions "are justified without reference to the con-
tent of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a signif-
icant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication of the information."
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 486 U.S.
288, 293 (1984)).
103. Id. at 2524.
particular public interests, injunctions are issued by a court against spe-
cific groups or an individual in direct response to "violations or
(threatened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree.""' In addition,
the Court emphasized that injunctions are subject to "greater risks of
censorship and discriminatory application" than ordinances. 5
Because of these stated differences existing between statutes and in-
junctions, the Court concluded that a "somewhat more stringent" First
Amendment standard must be applied to content-neutral injunctions."
In examining past cases involving speech-restricting injunctions, °1 the
majority stated that the Court had been particularly careful to ensure
that the intended effect of the injunction and the prohibitions the injunc-
tion placed upon speech were constructed in a manner consistent with
the general rule "'that injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to
the defendants than necessary to provide complete relief to the plain-
tiffs.'"'" Thus, the standard intermediate level of analysis generally used
for content-neutral regulations was not stringent enough to determine
the constitutionality of content-neutral injunctions."'° Rather, the rele-
vant inquiry in determining the constitutionality of a content-neutral
injunction, and thus the relevant inquiry in this case, was "whether the
104. Id.; see United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (outlining the
basic rationale and purpose of an injunction).
105. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. The Court in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), stated:
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreason-
able government than to require that the principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, noth-
ing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those offi-
cials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected.
Id. at 112-13.
Despite the potential dangers of injunctions, the Court stated that injunctions do
possess some advantages over ordinances. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. For instance,
injunctions, as opposed to ordinances, sometimes provide a more appropriate remedy
because they are more narrowly tailored to the violation of the law, which more often
than not has already occurred. Id. (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987)).
106. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
107. The cases cited by the Court included: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886 (1982); Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175
(1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); and Milk Wagon Drivers v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
108. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting Califano v. Yamasald, 442 U.S. 682, 702
(1979)).
109. Id.
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challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than
necessary to serve a significant government interest.""'
Having determined the applicable First Amendment standard, the
Court next considered the lower court's findings that the injunction ad-
vanced important government interests."' First, the majority agreed
with the lower court "that the State has a strong interest in protecting a
woman's freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services in con-
nection with her pregnancy."1"2 Second, the Court concurred that "[t]he
State also has a strong interest in ensuring the public safety and order, in
promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets and sidewalks, and in
protecting the property rights of all its citizens.""' Finally, the Court
agreed that "the State's strong interest in residential privacy, acknowl-




Thus, the Court was in accord with the lower court's finding that the
provisions of the injunction protected significant government interests.
Having determined the appropriate standard of review and approved
the State's asserted interests, the majority then considered each provi-
sion of the injunction to determine whether the provision burdened no
more speech than necessary to serve these significant government inter-
ests."15
1. The Thirty-Six-Foot Buffer Zone
In order to ensure access to the clinic, the state court forbid petition-
ers from "congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering"
within thirty-six feet of the clinic's property line."6 The state court or-
dered this thirty-six-foot buffer zone after determining that the petition-
ers were continuing to impede access to the clinic despite the initial
injunction."7 The speech-free buffer zone forced petitioners to move
their protest activities away from the driveway of the clinic, where the
lower court determined the protest activities often blocked patients' and
employees' access to the clinic."8 The buffer zone also prohibited peti-
110. Id. Hereinafter, the standard the majority used to analyze speech-restricting in-
junctions will be called the heightened intermediate standard of review.
111. Id. at 2526.
112. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
113. Id.
114. Id. (citation omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The initial injunction, however, contained no such buffer zone. Id. at 2527.
118. Id. at 2526; see Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (upholding stat-
tioners from invading private property located to the north and west of
the clinic."9
In determining whether the provision requiring the thirty-six foot buff-
er zone burdened more speech than necessary to accomplish its goal, the
Court first noted a distinction between the type of "focused picketing"
engaged in by petitioners, aimed primarily at the patients and staff of the
clinic, and the more general type of communication that can never be
completely prohibited in public places, such as distributing leaflets and
soliciting.2" The majority stated that the speech-free buffer zone sur-
rounding the entrances and the parking lot ensured unfettered access to
the clinic. 2' Moreover, the Court reasoned that after the initial injunc-
tion failed to achieve the desired degree of access to the clinic, the state




Nevertheless, the majority questioned the necessity of having a com-
plete buffer zone surrounding the entrances and driveway of the clin-
ic. 23 Notwithstanding the supposedly heightened standard of review,
the majority quickly reasoned that the court below must be given some
deference because of its familiarity with the factual background of the
conflict.'24 In addition, the Court noted that, during the evidentiary
hearing before the state court, a petitioner's witness admitted that the
thirty-six foot buffer zone was not overly broad; rather, the buffer zone
permitted anti-abortion protesters to stand approximately ten to twelve
feet from vehicles entering and exiting the clinic property. 25 On bal-
ute which forbid picketing that blocked or unreasonably interfered with access to or
from public buildings, including courthouses, and with traffic on the adjacent side-
walks).
119. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527.
120. Id.; see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (distinguishing focused picketing
from more generally directed means of communication).
121. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527.
122. Id. The majority noted that the failure of the initial order could be a factor
taken into consideration in determining the constitutionality of the broader order. Id.;
see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-98 (1978)
(stating that "[hiaving found the Society guilty of a violation of the Sherman Act, the
District Court was empowered to fashion appropriate restraints on the Society's fu-
ture activities both to avoid a recurrence of the violation and to eliminate its conse-
quences").
123. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527.
124. Id.; see Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 294
(1941) (stating "it is not for us to make an independent valuation of the testimony
before the master").
. 125. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527.
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ance, the Court determined that the thirty-six foot buffer zone surround-
ing the clinic entrances and driveway burdened no more speech than
necessary to satisfy the stated governmental interests.2 '
The Court next considered the portion of the buffer zone provision
that prohibited protesters from entering the private property in the back
and on the side of the clinic. 27 The Court struck down this portion,
concluding that it burdened more speech than necessary to accomplish
the state's interest in ensuring unimpeded access to the clinic.'28 This
portion of the injunction failed to satisfy the heightened level of scrutiny
because there was no evidence presented to the state court which dem-
onstrated that by standing on the adjacent property petitioners were
impeding access to the clinic.'"
2. Restriction on Noise Levels Outside of the Clinic
The injunction prohibited petitioners, between 7:30 am. and 12:00
noon on Mondays through Saturdays, from "'singing, chanting, whistling,
shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification
equipment or other sounds or images observable to or within earshot of
the patients inside the Clinic.""' In examining this provision of the in-
junction, the Court emphasized that the location where the regulations
are applied must be taken into account in ascertaining whether the regu-
lations burden more speech than necessary. 3 ' The majority relied on
Grayned v. City of Rockford," which considered similar noise restric-
tions. In Grayned, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting persons
from willfully making noise while on grounds adjacent to a school that
was in session."
126. Id. In upholding this provision, the majority reasoned that despite the restric-
tions created by the buffer zone, the petitioners' message of pro-life could still be
seen and heard from the parking lots of the clinic. Id.
127. Id. at 2528.
128. Id. The majority stated that access to the clinic could be obtained without
having to enter either the back or side. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2522 (quoting Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d
664, 679 (Fla. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516 (1994)).
131. Id. at 2528.
132. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
133. Id. at 119. The Court in Grayned stated that "the nature of a place, 'the pat-
tern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations . that are reason-
able.'" Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
In Madsen, the Court reasoned that noise control around hospitals and
other medical buildings was especially important during surgery and
recovery periods. 34 The majority emphasized that the "First Amend-
ment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Her-
culean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests."'" Accord-
ingly, the majority held that this provision of the injunction did not bur-
den more speech than necessary to serve the significant government
interest in the "health and well-being of the patients at the clinic.""6
3. Restriction on Images Observable Outside of the Clinic
The "images observable" provision of the injunction did not garner
much discussion from the Court.'37 The majority struck down the broad.
provision banning all images observable from inside the clinic, stating
that it burdened more speech than necessary even when balanced against,
the state's strong interest in reducing the number of threats received by
patients and their families.'" The Court reasoned that even if the state's;
interest was to lower the degree of anxiety and hypertension experi-
enced by the patients inside the clinic, the broad blanket ban against all
observable images would still not pass the heightened intermediate stan-
dard of review."
The majority reasoned that this provision could have been more nar-.
rowly tailored, such as by prohibiting only those. observable images that
"could be interpreted as threats or veiled threats."4 ° Further, the Court
added that the only valid reason images would bother a person inside the
clinic would be if the images were offensive to that person.'4 ' Rather
than suppressing all offensive images, the Court stated it would be easier
134. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528; see NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 783-
84 n.12 (1979) (emphasizing that hospitals are places "'where human ailments are
treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional strain and wor-
ry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the day's activity,
and where the patient and his family . . . need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and
helpful atmosphere'") (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 509 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
135. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528. The Court cited its decision in Grayned which
asserted: "[IIf overamplified loudspeakers assault the citizenry, government may turn
them down.'" Id. (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2528-29.
138. Id. at 2529.
139. Id.
140. Id. The Court stated threats made to patients or their families are certainly
forbidden under the First Amendment Id.
141. Id.
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for the patients and staff to simply close their curtains.4 2 Thus, the ma-
jority concluded that this provision of the injunction violated the First
Amendment."
4. Three-Hundred-Foot Restriction on Petitioners from Physically
Approaching Individuals Seeking to Gain Access to the Clinic
The state's interest in enacting this provision was to protect individu-*
als seeking the services of the clinic from being "stalked" or "shad-
owed."'44 The majority did not agree, however, that the state court's
justification of the total ban on individuals approaching within 300 feet
of the clinic entrances was justified.' Rather, the Court stated that
without any evidence demonstrating that petitioners' speech is "indepen-
dently proscribable "  or "is so infused with violence as to be indistin-
guishable from a threat of physical harm," the provision burdened more
speech than necessary to protect the state's interest.'47 In concluding
that this provision did not withstand First Amendment scrutiny, the
Court added that generally "'in public debate our own citizens must tol-
erate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate
breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.'" 4 '
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.; see International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct
2701, 2708 (1992) ("[Fjace-to-face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an ap-
propriate target of regulation. The skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor can target the
most vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those suffering physical
impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicitation.").
145. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529. The Chief Justice stated "it is difficult . . . to justi-
fy a prohibition on al uninvited approaches of persons seeking the services of the
clinic, regardless of how peaceful the contact may be, without burdening more
speech than necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic." Id.
146. Id. The Court cited "fighting words" as an example. Id.
147. Id.; see Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadownoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 292-93
(1941) (upholding a speech-restricting injunction on the basis the protesters engaged
in coercive speech infused with violence).
148. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)
(internal quotations marks omitted in original)).
5. Prohibition Against Picketing, Demonstrating, or Using Sound
Amplification Equipment Within 300 Feet from the
Homes of the Clinic's Staff
4 9
In analyzing this particular provision of the injunction, the Court noted
that the same analysis it applied to sound amplification at the clinic
should be used here as well. 5 ' The majority relied on Frisby v.
Schultz,'' which upheld an ordinance prohibiting targeted picketing in
residential areas based on the proposition that the home is "'the last cit-
adel of the tired, the weary, and the sick.'"'52
Despite the decisions upholding similar regulations prohibiting targeted
residential picketing, the Court in the present case struck down the 300-
foot buffer zone provision." The majority commented that this provi-
sion was much too broad and that a similar, narrower provision could
have achieved the same effect." Because the evidence presented to the
state court could not justify a ban on general picketing through a resi-
dential neighborhood,'55 the Court determined a 300-foot buffer zone
surrounding the residences of the clinic's staff members burdened more
speech than necessary to satisfy the State's interest."
6. Petitioners' Vagueness and Overbreadth Challenges
After analyzing each provision of the injunction separately, the Court
addressed petitioners' final two arguments. 7 First, petitioners asserted
149. This restriction also prohibited blocking access to streets that provided the
only means of entry to the streets where the clinic's staff lived. Id. at 2529.
150. Id.; see supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text (discussing restriction on
noise levels). The Court, relying on Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116
(1972), stated that the government may require that protesters lower the volume if
the noise from their protests overwhelms the neighborhood. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at
2529.
151. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
152. Id. at 484 (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring)).
153. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529-30.
154. Id. at 2530.
155. Id. The court compared this broad provision with the narrower ordinance at
issue in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), and determined that the former could
not stand. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530. The ordinance in fr'isby only prohibited pro-
testers from "engag[ing] in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any
individual." Prisby, 487 U.S. at 477. The relevant provision in Madsen, on the other
hand, forbid protesters from even walking through the residential neighborhoods
where any member of the clinic's staff resided. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
156. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530. The Court suggested that a limit on the "time,
duration of picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller zone could have ac-
complished the desired result." Id.
157. Id.
[Vol. 24: 203, 1996] Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
that the injunction issued by the state court was vague and
overbroad." Specifically, petitioners objected to the vague wording of
the injunction making it applicable to the individuals acting "in concert"
with the named parties in the order. 9 The Court concluded that be-
cause petitioners consisted of the parties named in the injunction, peti-
tioners lacked standing to challenge the portion of the injunction apply-
ing to persons who were not parties."6
The Court determined that petitioners' overbreadth argument failed as
well because the challenged statement did not actually regulate any con-
duct; rather, it merely applied to unnamed individuals who may be found
in the future "to be acting 'in concert' with the named parties."'6 ' Thus,
the Court stated that its previous holding in Regal Knitwear Co. v.
NLRB'" was applicable to the instant case."1 In Regal Knitwear, the
named party challenged a provision of an injunction directed at the "suc-
cessors and assigns" of the enjoined party."6 The Court in Regal Knit-
wear held that because the party asserting the claim was not a successor
or assign, the argument was invalid and "an abstract controversy over
the use of these words.""5
158. Id. Commonly parties raise overbreadth and vagueness arguments to challenge
the constitutionality of a statute. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)
(striking down a statute requiring citizens to furnish police with "credible" identifi-
cation); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (ne-
gating an antisolicitation ordinance); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (up-
holding restrictions on political activity by state employees); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963) (rejecting law aimed at attorney solicitation). A court will consider a
statute overly broad if, in addition to proscribing activities that may constitutionally
be forbidden, it also restricts speech or conduct that the court has protected by the
guarantees of free speech or free association. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97
(1940) (invalidating antilabor statute). A statute will be declared void for vagueness
when, as a matter of due process, persons "of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at [the statute's] meaning and diffei as to its application." Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 393-95 (1926) (addressing indefinite and obscure wage
law).
For a thorough discussion of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines see
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 22, §§ 16.8-16.9, at 944-52.
159. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945).
163. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
164. Regal Knitwear, 324 U.S. at 14.
165. Id. at 15.
Second, petitioners argued that the acting in concert provision of the
injunction violated the First Amendment because it impeded their free-
dom of association." The Court rejected this contention, reasoning
that the injunction did not prohibit petitioners from gathering or associ-
ating with others in order to communicate a particular point of view.'67
The injunction instead only regulated the manner in which petitioners
conducted their protest activity.'8 Moreover, the majority emphasized
that "joining with others for the purpose of depriving third parties of
their lawful rights" is not protected by the First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of association. 
69
In conclusion, the Court summarized its findings. The noise restric-
tions and the thirty-six-foot speech-free buffer zone surrounding the
clinic's property were valid "because they burden[ed] no more speech
than necessary to eliminate the unlawful conduct targeted by the state
court's injunction."'70 On the other hand, the thirty-six-foot buffer zone
as applied to the private property to the north and west of the clinic, the
images observable provision, the 300-foot no approach zone around the
clinic, and the 300-foot buffer zone around the residences were struck
down because they were "broad[er] than necessary to accomplish the
permissible goals of the injunction." 7'
166. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530. Although the First Amendment does not expressly
mention the freedom of association, the Supreme Court has held that the freedom
derives by implication from the explicitly stated right of speech, press, assembly, and
petition. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 991 (1982) (hold-
ing that a boycott of white merchants by several hundred black people involved the
constitutionally protected activities of speech, assembly, association, and petition con-
tained in the First Amendment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (holding a
provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 invalid because it imposed
impermissible restraint on the basic freedoms of speech and association protected by
the First Amendment); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,
221-22 (1967) (holding the "freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments" allows the Union "to hire attorneys on a sala-
ry basis to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights"); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (noting that freedom of association
is an "inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech"). In order to restrict
freedom of association, the government must demonstrate that the governmental inter-
est being pursued is a compelling one, and that such an interest cannot be achieved
by means less restrictive of the freedom of association. See generally Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460-63 (1958) (explaining need for overriding state interest).
For a thorough discussion of the freedom of association see NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 22, § 16.41, at 1062-69.
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B. Justice Souter's Concurring Opinion
In his concurrence, Justice Souter wrote separately to clarify two as-
pects of the record.'" First, Justice Souter disagreed with the majority's
discussion of the acting in concert provision of the injunction.' 3 The
majority stated that the individuals subject to the injunction's restrictions
were those individuals that happened to share the same viewpoint re-
garding abortion.' 4 Justice Souter asserted, on the other hand, that the
trial court judge had made it clear that the determination of who would
be considered as acting in concert with the named defendants would be
decided on a case-by-case basis rather than on the basis of the
individual's viewpoints.' 5
Second, Justice Souter noted that petitioners had conceded that Flori-
da law recognizes the state's interests in protecting public safety, unim-
peded flow of traffic, and property rights.7 '
C. Justice Stevens' Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's determination that the in-
junction was a "content-based restriction on free speech." " Fuither-
more, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's dismissal of the vague-
ness and overbreaclth arguments regarding the acting in concert provi-
sion of the injunction.' 8 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens parted with the
majority regarding the appropriate standard under which the Court
should analyze content-neutral injunctions.'7 9
According to Justice Stevens, injunctions, as opposed to generally
applicable legislation, should be analyzed under "a more lenient stan-
dard" than employed by the majority.'" Justice Stevens, like the majori-
172. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
173. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
174. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
175. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). But see id. at 2539-40 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing the amended injunction restrained
petitioners based on their "proscribable views").
176. Id. at 2530-31 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Brief for Petitioners at 17 & n.7
(citing FLA- STAT. ANN. §§ 870.041-.047 (West 1991) (public peace); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 316.2045 (West 1991) (obstruction of public streets, highways, and roads))). The
majority did not comment on whether petitioners had conceded this point.
177. Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority adopt-
ty, discussed the differences existing between statutes and injunctions
that support a lower standard of review. 8 ' He stated two distinct quali-
ties of injunctions, not applicable to statutes, governing the standard
used in analyzing injunctions. 8" First, he noted the traditional require-
ment that injunctions "should be no more burdensome than necessary to
provide complete relief."" According to Justice Stevens, "[11n a First
Amendment context... the property of the [injunctive] remedy depends
almost entirely on the character of the violation and the likelihood of its
recurrence.""s Thus, the constitutionality of an injunction should not be
evaluated under the same standards as those employed to analyze stat-
utes. "
Second, "even if an injunction impinges on a constitutional right," it
still may be necessary to forbid more than the enjoined parties' con-
duct.'" Justice Stevens observed that remedies provided by injunctions
frequently "include commands that the law does not impose on the com-
munity at large."'87 Thus, "repeated violations [of a court order] may
justify sanctions that might be invalid if applied to a first offender or if
enacted by the legislature."" ' Because a trial court is more familiar
ed a "somewhat more stringent" First Amendment standard of review than typically
used for determining the constitutionality of content-neutral statutes. Id. at 2524. The
standard articulated by the majority focused on "whether the challenged provisions of
the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant interest"
Id. at 2525.
181. Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens reiterated the majority's assertion that the one major difference between stat-
utes and injunctions is that the courts indiscriminately aim the former at the entire
community, while the courts impose the latter specifically on an individual or a nar-
row group of individuals who have been denied a liberty by the court as a result of
some involvement in illegal acts. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
182. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Califano v.
Yamasaki, 422 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)).
184. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The remedy that an
injunction provides "must include appropriate restraints on 'future activities both to
avoid a recurrence of the violation and to eliminate its consequences.'" Id. (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-98 (1978)).
187. Id. at 2531-32 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 309-10 & n.22 (1986)):
188. Id. at 2532 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)). Justice Stevens noted that the trial
court, after hearing three days of testimony, determined that petitioners had commit-
ted tortious acts and continuously violated the initial injunction. Id. (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). Hence, the trial court issued the injunction
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with the facts justifying an injunction and in a better position to deter-
mine its scope, Justice Stevens reasoned that injunctions should be ana-
lyzed under a "standard that gives appropriate deference to the judge's
unique familiarity with the facts.""9
After concluding that injunctions should be analyzed under a more
lenient standard than statutes, Justice Stevens went on to address the
three issues presented by petitioners." First, Justice Stevens concurred
with the majority that the thirty-six-foot speech-free buffer zone did not
violate the First Amendment. 9' Focusing on the noted differences be-
tween statutes and injunctions,'" Justice Stevens reasoned that legisla-
tion forbidding protesters from demonstrating within thirty-six feet of a
clinic would most likely violate the First Amendment." On the other
hand, an injunction prohibiting speech within that same zone and aimed
at particular individuals "who have engaged in unlawful conduct in a
similar zone" in the past would probably withstand First Amendment
scrutiny. 194
Second, Justice Stevens addressed "whether the 'consent requirement
before speech is permitted' within a 300-foot buffer zone around the
clinic unconstitutionally infringes on free speech."'95 He argued that
both petitioners and the majority misinterpreted the meaning of this part
of the injunction."
based on the court's factual findings of petitioners' repeated violations. Id. (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. Id. at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens asserted that the majority erred in analyzing provisions of the injunction not
challenged by petitioners. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
He argued that petitioners only attacked the constitutionality of three issues: (1) the
36-foot buffer zone; (2) the consent requirement before speech is permitted within a
300-foot buffer zone; and (3) the acting in concert provision. Id. at 2531-33 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens believed the majority
should not have considered the remaining provisions of the injunction because the
petitioners did not raise them in their briefs. Id. at 2531, 2533 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
191. Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra
notes 116-29 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's analysis of speech-free
buffer zone provision).
192. See supra note 181 (explaining similar difference noted by the majority and
Justice Stevens).
193. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
194. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. Id. at 2532 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra note 60
Justice Stevens interpreted this provision as only prohibiting petition-
ers from "physically approaching" an individual entering the clinic unless
she "indicates a desire to communicate."' Even if the individual ex-
pressed no such inclination to communicate, as long as petitioners did
"not accompany... encircle, surround, harass, threaten or physically or
verbally abuse" the individual, then petitioners were still permitted to
communicate with the individual and could even sidewalk counsel poten-
tial patients by offering oral or written advice.'98
Thus, Justice Stevens argued that the majority erred in holding that the
300-foot buffer zone provision was too broad to withstand the heightened
level of intermediate scrutiny."9 He maintained that the "physically ap-
proaching" provision, as stated in the injunction, was no broader than
for the text of paragraph five of the injunction. Justice Stevens stated that petitioners
read the injunction as forbidding any speech within 300 feet of the clinic unless the
listener demonstrated an interest in what they had to say. Id. at 2532 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority interpreted this consent re-
quirement as unconstitutional even if drafted in a more narrow manner. Id. (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing id. at 2529). For a discussion of
the majority's reasoning regarding the rejection of the 300-foot consent requirement
provision, see supra notes 14448 and accompanying text.
197. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2532 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
198. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
reasoned that sidewalk counseling is comparable to labor picketing in that both are a
"mixture of conduct and communication." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). He noted that sidewalk counseling, like labor picketing, is a much
more persuasive form of expression than simply distributing handbills, because the
latter depends largely on the "persuasive force of the idea." Id. at 2532-33 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employ-
ees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in result)).
In Retail Store Employees, the Court stated that "[iun the labor context, it is the
conduct element rather than the particular idea being expressed that often provides
the most persuasive deterrent to third persons about to enter a business establish-
ment." Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in result). Justice Stevens, in Madsen, conceded that the First Amendment
protects a protester's right to sidewalk counsel passersby; however, he emphasized
that the protection "does not encompass attempts to abuse an unreceptive or captive
audience." Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). He pointed out that "[olne may register a public protest by placing a vulgar
message on his jacket and, in so doing, expose unwilling viewers." Madsen, 114 S.
Ct. at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971)). But, it does not follow that the protester has
an "unqualified constitutional right to follow and harass an unwilling listener, especial-
ly one on her way to receive medical services." Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2533 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 116 (1972)).
199. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2532-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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necessary to afford relief to respondents for the violations found by the
trial court.2° Justice Stevens noted that the trial court judge issued this
particular provision because the evidence demonstrated that it was re-
quired to protect patients and employees from petitioners' "'uninvited
contacts, shadowing and stalking.'"2"' Accordingly, Justice Stevens dis-
sented from the majority's conclusion that the 300-foot buffer zone bur-
dened more speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest.2"
In concluding his opinion, Justice Stevens stated that he would not
consider the other provisions of the injunction as discussed by the ma-
jority because petitioners failed to raise them on appeal.2"
D. Justice Scalia's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Although concurring in the judgment in part, Justice Scalia, joined by
Justices Kennedy and Thomas, strongly dissented from the majority's
decision.2" Justice Scalia characterized the majority's opinion as having
"an appearance of moderation and Solomonic wisdom," which upheld
certain portions of the injunction while striking others as unconstitution-
al.205 Justice Scalia branded this appearance as misleading because the
"entire injunction in this case departs so far from the established course
of our jurisprudence that in any other context it would have been regard-
ed as a candidate for summary reversal."2' The dissent believed that a
200. Id. at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). In
upholding this provision of the injunction, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized:
While the First Amendment confers on each citizen a powerful right to ex-
press oneself, it gives the picketer no boon to jeopardize the health, safety,
and rights of others. No citizen has a right to insert a foot in the hospital or
clinic door and insist on being heard-while purposefully blocking the door
to those in genuine need of medical services. No picketer can force speech
into the captive ear of the unwilling and disabled.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Operation Rescue v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 675 (Fla. 1993) affd in part, rev'd in part,
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516).
202. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. Id. at 2533-34 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Id. at 2534-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
205. Id. at 2534 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
206. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
major reason the Court was willing to uphold portions of the injunction
was because the case involved abortion."7
Justice Scalia's view of the facts presented at the state court level
varied greatly from that of the majority.2' He argued there was no evi-
dence presented to the state court which demonstrated that petitioners'
activities at the clinic constituted unlawful conduct.2" Thus, the dissent
reasoned that because petitioners did not break any laws, the provisions
of the injunction which the majority upheld, i.e., the thirty-six-foot buffer
zone and the noise restrictions, were in clear violation of the First
Amendment." '
In support of its assertion that there was a lack of evidence demon-
strating that petitioners had engaged in unlawful conduct, the dissent
focused on the videotape presented by respondents at the state court
proceedings.2"' After describing the video in great detail, the dissent
207. Id. at 2534-35 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). The dissent referred to a passage in Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), where Justice O'Connor stated:
"This Court's abortion decisions have already worked a major distortion in
the Court's constitutional jurisprudence. Today's decision goes further, and
makes it painfully clear that no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc
nullification by this Court when an occasion for its application arises in a
case involving state regulation of abortion. The permissible scope of abortion
regulation is not the only constitutional issue on which this Court is divided,
but--except when it comes to abortion-the Court has generally refused to
let such disagreements, however longstanding or deeply felt, prevent it from
evenhandedly applying uncontroversial legal doctrines to cases that come
before it."
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted in original) (emphasis added)).
208. Compare Madsen, 114 S. Ct at 2537 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (finding protesters left access to the clinic unimpeded in
exercising their First Amendment rights), with id. at 2521 (finding protesters impeded
access to the clinic and caused patients stress).
209. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). The majority asserted that Justice Scalia only considered the
videotape presented by respondents, and failed to acknowledge the three days of tes-
timony by respondents' witnesses presented at the trial court Id. at 2527. The dissent
did not rely only on the videotape as suggested by the majority, however, it also
examined the trial court's record and findings. See id. at 2537, 2545-47 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
210. Id. at 2535 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
211. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
dissent noted that the videotape was shot by respondents, who then edited the tape
from approximately eight hours of footage to half an hour. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, the footage remaining
after the editing showed arguably the worst activities engaged in by petitioners, be-
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characterized petitioners' activities as mild compared to typical labor or
social protest picketing." The dissent also carefully pointed out por-
tions of the videotape evidencing that petitioners activities were far from
illegal or even improper, and, thus were not in violation of the initial
injunction. 3 For instance, although petitioners approached vehicles
and distributed literature to the cars' occupants, they in no way attempt-
ed to block the vehicles from entering the clinic property. 4 The dis-
senters also noted that the one act shown on the videotape which could
be characterized as illegal could not be conclusively linked to petition-
ers.
215
1. First Amendment Standard
The dissent argued that the majority applied the wrong First Amend-
ment standard in determining the constitutionality of the injunction.1 6
Agreeing with petitioners, the dissent asserted that the injunction de-
served a strict scrutiny level of analysis. 7 In addition, it questioned the
cause respondents were attempting to demonstrate that petitioners continued to vio-
late the terms of the initial injunction. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
212. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). For
instance, the dissent noted that the videotape showed petitioners "singing, chanting,
praying, shouting, playing music . . . [giving] speeches, peaceful[ly] picketing," distrib-
uting handbills, and engaging in interviews with the press. Id. at 2537 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). But cf. Milk Wagon Drivers v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 291-92 (1941) (involving protesters engaging
in more than 50 instances of violence including window smashing, setting off explo-
sive bombs, setting fire to numerous vehicles, shootings, and beatings).
213. Madsen, 114 S. Ct at 2535-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
214. Id. at 2536 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). In another scene from the videotape, pro-choice supporters exchanged words
with pro-life activists, but at no point were there any acts of violence or physical
contact between the groups, despite their close proximity and the hostile environ-
ment. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
215. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
videotape shows a potato jammed into the tailpipe of a parked car;, however, the
tape failed to capture the person or persons responsible for the act. Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
216. Id. at 2537 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). The dissent labeled the First Amendment standard adopted by the majority
intermediate-intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
217. Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
majority's reasoning in deciding upon the heightened intermediate stan-
dard of review."8 The dissent observed that there was no recognizable
difference between the standard used by the majority in the present case
and the intermediate scrutiny standard generally used for analyzing con-
tent-neutral ordinances." Furthermore, it criticized the majority for
failing to even consider the strict scrutiny standard.220
The dissent further explained that the injunction directed at petitioners
was content-based. " It rejected the majority's claim that the injunction
was content-neutral because the Court pointed it solely at those individu-
als who violated the earlier injunction, not at those who merely espoused
anti-abortion beliefs.2" If the majority's assertion was true, then the in-
dividuals included in the acting in concert provision did not encompass
those who merely possess similar anti-abortion beliefs. 3 In direct con-
tradiction to the majority's claim, the dissent noted that the state court
judge issuing the injunction interpreted the acting in concert provision as
including "all those who wish to express the same views as the named
defendants."' 4
The dissent quoted several exchanges that took place between the
state court judge and the individuals arrested because they were found
to be acting in concert with the named defendants.2 ' These exchanges
demonstrated that, contrary to the majority's opinion, the state court
judge aimed the injunction only at those who espoused the anti-abortion
viewpoint.2
8
Mr. Lacy: I was wondering... why we were arrested and confined as being in
concert with these people that we don't know, when other people weren't, that
were in that same buffer zone, and it was kind of selective as to who was picked
part).
218. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
219. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
220. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
dissent argued the majority should have, at a minimum, commented on the argument
that an injunction restricting speech, whether content-based or content-neutral, de-
served this strict scrutiny level of review. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
221. Id. at 2539 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
222. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
223. Id. at 253940 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
224. Id. at 2540 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Despite this interpretation by the state court, the majority determined that the
injunction did not apply to individuals who espoused anti-abortion beliefs, but rather
to those who had violated the initial injunction. Id. at 2523.
225. Id. at 2540 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
226. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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and who was arrested and who was obtained for the same buffer zone in the
same public injunction.
The Court: Mr. Lacy, I understand that those on the other side of the issue [abor-
tion-rights supporters] were also in the area. If you are referring to them, the
Injunction did not pertain to those on the other side of the issue, because the
word in concert with means in concert with those who had taken a certain posi-
tion in respect to the clinic, adverse to the clinic. If you are saying that is the
selective basis that the pro-choice were not arrested when pro-life was arrested,
that's the basis of the selection .... "'
2. Rationale for Asserting that the Speech-restricting Injunction
Demanded Strict Scrutiny
The dissent emphasized that even assuming the injunction was not
"technically content based," it still demanded strict scrutiny because of
the dangers involved with all speech-restricting injunctions.' The dis-
sent listed several rationales for why strict scrutiny was the proper stan-
dard to determine the constitutionality of the injunction.' First, the
general concern that content-based statutes and speech-restricting injunc-
tions are invidiously enacted to suppress certain undesirable views.'3
Second, injunctions are at least as deserving of strict scrutiny as content-
based statutes because individual judges, not legislatures, are charged
with drafting injunctions. 3 Finally, an "injunction is a much more pow-
erful weapon than a statute, and so should be subjected to greater safe-
guards."2
227. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Transcript of Appearance Hearings at 104-05 (Apr. 12, 1993) (alteration in origi-
nal)).
228. Id. at 2539 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
229. Id. at 2538-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
230. Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
231. Id. at 2539 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). The dissent suggested that in some cases, the issuing judge may be biased
against the party because the party has disobeyed the judge's prior orders. Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
232. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
dissent explained that in a contempt proceeding for disobeying an injunction, factual
innocence is the only defense available. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). Thus, even if the injunction is later found to be uncon-
stitutional, the named party must still obey. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part). See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
The dissent rejected the majority's attempt "to minimize the
similarit[ies] between speech-restricting injunctions and content-based
statut[es]."2" The majority asserted that just because an injunction is
issued against a group of individuals sharing the same beliefs, this does
not mean the Court issued it based on a wrongful motive to silence the
group's point of view.' This distinction, the dissent argued, missed the
point that a content-based statute demands strict scrutiny not because of
a possible discriminatory motive of silencing certain ideas, but rather
because the legislation "lends itself to use for those purposes."235
In further support of the assertion that all speech-restricting injunc-
tions deserve strict scrutiny, the dissent enunciated "reasons of prece-
dence."236 First, an injunction that regulates speech is a form of prior
restraint, the archenemy of the First Amendment. 7 Thus, the dissent
stated that the rationale behind prior restraint cases also applies to
speech-restricting injunctions.' Historically, the Court has stated that
prior restraint of expressive activity should be avoided at almost all costs
and that prior restraint carries with it a "'heavy presumption'" of uncon-
(1967) (removing unconstitutionality as a defense to injunctions). Therefore, individu-
als silenced by an injunction who cannot afford to file an appeal are confronted with
a "Hobson's choice: they must remain silent, since if they speak their First
Amendment rights are no defense in subsequent contempt proceedings." Madsen, 114
S. Ct. at 2539 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
233. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
234. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
235. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (em-
phasis added). The dissent noted that the Court has "consistently held that '[i]llicit
legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment.'" Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in
original) (quoting Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims, 502 U.S. 105 (1991)).
236. Id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in-
part).
237. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
dissent relied on Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993), for this proposi-
tion. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). In Alexander, Chief Justice Relmquist emphasized that "[the term
prior restraint is used 'to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding cer-
tain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications
are to occur.'. . . [Plermanent injunctions, i.e.,-court orders that actually forbid
speech activities-are classic examples of prior restraints." Id. at 2771 (quoting MEL-
VILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT § 4.03, at 4-14 (1984) (emphasis omitted)).
238. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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stitutionality. 23 In addition, the dissent noted that the Court has "re-
peatedly struck down speech-restricting injunctions."2 41
Moreover, the dissent noted that respondents, as well as amicus of
respondents, failed to cite any speech-restricting injunction cases which
employed an intermediate standard of review.2 4' On the contrary,
speech-restricting injunction cases have "affirmed both requirements that
characterize strict scrutiny: compelling public need and surgical preci-
sion of restraint," even when the case involved activities outside the pro-
tection of the First Amendment, such as violent conduct.24 According-
ly, the dissent concluded speech-restricting injunctions should be ana-
lyzed under a strict scrutiny standard.243
3. Review of the Majority's Analysis
After discussing why the majority used the wrong First Amendment
standard, the dissent turned to the majority's application of this interme-
239. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (quoting
Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181, (1968)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
240. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2541. See, e.g., National Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie,
432 U.S. 43 (1977) (requiring state court to impose a stay in the absence of immedi-
ate appellate review); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (striking
down restrictions placed on press during a murder trial); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (upholding the First Amendment rights in light of
government's strong interest in preventing the general dissemination of classified ma-
terials); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (striking down
an injunction preventing the distribution of critical literature); Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (upholding an injunction provision prohibiting the intimida-
tion or obstruction of a business, while striking down a provision prohibiting "pick-
eting or patrolling" of a business).
241. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). The dissent regarded the intermediate standard, generally used in
analyzing content-neutral statutes, and the heightened intermediate standard, used by
the majority in the present case, as practically indistinguishable. Id. at 2538 (Scala,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
242. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (em-
phasis added). See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (stat-
ing that although violence is not protected by the First Amendment, when violent
conduct giving rise to tort liability "occurs in the context of constitutionally protected
activity . . . 'precision of regulation' is demanded") (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
243. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
diate-intermediate standard of review to the speech-restricting injunc-
tion.2" First, the dissent criticized the majority's acceptance of the
government's interests as significant without independently considering
whether petitioners violated the terms of the original injunction.245 The
dissent went on to criticize the majority for taking the trial court's find-
ings that petitioners violated the original irjunction "on faith."246 It sug-
gested that these findings were suspect because the lower court also
upheld provisions that the majority struck down as having no basis.2 47
Moreover, the dissent noted that with First Amendment cases, the Court
generally requires a close review of the facts before reaching a conclu-
sion.2
48
Next, the dissent addressed whether the majority's application of the
restrictions imposed by the injunction burdened "no more speech than
necessary" to serve significant state interests.249 It concluded that the
provision regarding the noise restriction passed this part of the test be-
cause the injunction only forbade noise that would reach patients inside
the clinic.2" Thus, it agreed with the majority that the anti-noise provi-
sion burdened no more speech than necessary.25' Nonetheless, the dis-
senting Justices asserted that the noise restriction should be held invalid
244. Id. at 2544 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). The dissent commented that even under the heightened intermediate standard,
the majority erred in upholding the provisions. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
245. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
dissent stated that the government's interest must be one "whose impairment was a
violation of Florida law or of a Florida-court injunction" in order to be considered
significant. Id. at 2548 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
246. Id. at 2545 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). The dissent noted the only activity that could remotely be considered a viola-
tion of the initial injunction was petitioners' impeding access to the clinic. Id. at
2545-46 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Any
disruption of access into the clinic, however, was only the incidental result of dem-
onstrators marching in a picket line and distributing anti-abortion literature on public
property, and not the result of any intentional desire by petitioners to impede access
to and from the clinic. Id. at 2546 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
247. Id. at 2545 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
248. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915-16 n.50 (1982); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-86
(1927)).
249. Id. at 2548 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
250. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
251. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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for other reasons as well.252 Neither the Florida Supreme Court nor the
majority even attempted to connect the noise restriction provision with
any previous violations of the law by petitioners.2" Moreover, the noise
restriction did not satisfy the state's interest in reducing the noise level
outside the clinic, as pro-choice demonstrators could "continue to shout
their chants at their opponents exiled across the street to their hearts'
content."2"
Turning to the thirty-six-foot buffer zone provision, the dissent strongly
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the provision burdened no
more speech than was necessary.255 The dissent stated that the re-
striction could have been more narrowly drawn to satisfy the state's
interests in keeping the protesters "off the paved portion of Dixie Way"
and allowing unimpeded access to the clinic's driveways.2" For in-
stance, the provision could have prohibited petitioners from gathering in
the street or reduced the number of protestors allowed on the paved
portion of Dixie Way, either of which would have more narrowly satis-
fied the state's interests.
257
252. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
253. Id. at 2547 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). In countering the majority's reasoning that "hospital patients should not have to
be bothered with noise from political protests," the dissent argued that an injunction
imposing a noise restriction against a party who has not committed any prior viola-
tions of the law is an impermissible manner of forbidding the noise. Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
254. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (em-
phasis added).
255. Id. at 2548 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
256. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
257. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
majority responded to these options by noting that "[tihe state court was convinced
that [they would not work] in view of the failure of the first injunction to protect ac-
cess." Id. at 2527. The dissent criticized the majority for accepting the trial court's
position so readily, however, before determining for itself whether the 36-foot buffer
zone burdened more speech than necessary to serve a significant governmental inter-
est. Id. at 2548-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
The dissent questioned the amount of deference given to the trial court by the
majority and commented that the application of the majority's heightened intermediate
standard transformed the "burden no more speech than is necessary" test into an
.arguably burden no more speech than is necessary test." Id. at 2549 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
In conclusion, the dissent summarized its grave concerns with the
majority's decision to uphold the thirty-six-foot buffer zone and the noise
restriction provisions.2" The dissenting Justices regretted that although
the decision in Madsen will be labeled by the media as an abortion case,
it will be cited in legal texts and commentaries "as a free-speech irijunc-
tion case."2" As a result, the "novel principles" produced by the major-
ity in Madsen will further erode the protection guaranteed by the First
Amendment.2" Thus, the dissent warned that "these latest by-products
of our abortion jurisprudence ought to give all friends of liberty great
concern."
261
V. IMPACT OF THE MADSEN DECISION
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with abortion and the First
Amendment impact all Americans, regardless of their personal stance on
the issues.2' Accordingly, the decision in Madsen has garnered a signif-
icant response.2" Although the decision will have a direct impact only
258. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
dissenting opinion discusses only the two provisions of the injunction that were up-
held by the majority. Id. at 2549-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
259. Id. at 2549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
260. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
novel principles included "the proposition that injunctions against speech are subject
to a standard indistinguishable from... the 'intermediate scrutiny' standard...
used for 'time, place, and manner' legislative restrictions; the notion that injunctions
against speech need not be closely tied to any violation of law, but may simply im-
plement sound social policy; and the practice of accepting trial-court conclusions
permitting injunctions without considering whether those conclusions are supported
by any findings of fact" Id. at 2549-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
261. Id. at 2550 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
262. Chief Justice Tjoflat, who sat on the federal appeals court that heard the sepa-
rate challenge to the Madsen injunction, noted:
[Flew Americans are content with the current legal status of abortion in
America. Many see a woman's ability to choose abortion as a part of her
fundamental constitutional right of self-determination that is ill-protected by
the wavering jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Many others see the 1.4
million abortions each year as an American Holocaust permitted by the moral
vacillation of the government
Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 706 (llth Cir.), vacated, 41 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir.
1993).
263. One author feared the decision in Madsen, by restricting the free speech rights
of pro-life protesters, might lead to more violence because "[i]n order for pro-lifers to
work within the system, they must believe that their views can somehow . . . have
an impact" Richard Stith, A Pro-Life Strategy, WASH. PosT, Dec. 2, 1994, at A31. The
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on the minority of Americans who actually participate in organized pro-
test activities, it has the potential to have a significant indirect effect on
a much larger group. For instance, the opinion will discourage law abid-
ing anti-abortion protesters from participating in demonstrations for fear
of getting arrested at a clinic where an injunction has been issued.2"
This fear may reduce the amount of lawful anti-abortion expression dis-
seminated to the public, thereby preventing some individuals from form-
ing their opinions regarding abortion."
A "chilling effect" occurs when a court suppresses a protected legal
activity due to a fear of its legal or nonlegal consequences.2 " In-
junctions such as the one partially upheld in Madsen will undoubtedly
have this chilling effect on the speech of anti-abortion protesters.267 Ju-
dy Madsen," a fifty-eight-year-old volunteer sidewalk counselor at
abortion clinics, stated that "the injunction presents an immediate chal-
lenge to any pro-lifer trying to speak outside an abortion clinic."2 " Be-
decision extremely angered pro-life supporters. Joan Biskupic, Court Allows Abortion
Clinic Buffer Zone: Scalia Sees Threat to Free Speech Rights, WASH. POST, July 1,
1994, at Al. Mathew Stayer, an attorney who has represented anti-abortion protesters
in the past, stated that "[ylou can't give people your message when you have to stay
36 feet away." Id. Pro-choice supporters, on the other hand, were pleased with the
decision. Id. Eleanor Smeal, president of the Feminist Majority Foundation, declared
that the decision was "a good omen for the 40 other local and state injunctions in
place" at abortion clinics all over the country. Id.
264. Even law abiding pro-life demonstrators could be arrested merely through guilt
by association. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 253940 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part). Judge McGregor, who issued the injunction in
Madsen, told individuals who had been arrested for violating the injunction that the
police arrested them because they expressed a pro-life viewpoint, and were thus
found to be acting in concert with other pro-life protesters. Id. at 2540 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part),
265. Justice Holmes, in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), articulated the
"marketplace of ideas" theory. Holmes advocated that there should be "free trade in
ideas," and reasoned that the importance of allowing ideas to compete with each
other in the public forum is so great that even opinions society loathes should not
be suppressed. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
266. See generally Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 555-56 (1993) (examin-
ing chilling effect of federal legislation); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488-89
(1993) (rejecting argument that chilling effect would occur under criminal penalty en-
hancement statute); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50-52 (1971) (discussing role of
chilling effect on availability of injunctions).
267. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
268. Madsen was one of the original pro-life protesters named in the injunction is-
sued by the Florida state court. Id. at 2521.
269. John W. Kennedy, Buffer-Zone Case Tests Free Speech; Madsen v. Women's
cause a speech-restricting injunction eliminates not only the undesirable
behavior which the injunction targets, but also peaceful protest lying at
the heart of the First Amendment, a speech-restricting injunction de-
serves a stricter standard of review than that employed by the majority
in Madsen.
270
The Supreme Court and supporters of the Madsen decision argue that
the thirty-six-foot buffer zone does not prevent pro-life groups from dis-
seminating their message to the public.27' Although it is true that anti-
abortion advocates may still peacefully protest beyond the thirty-six-foot
buffer zone, it undoubtedly hinders the effectiveness of such a protest,
for the buffer zone affects both the message and the manner of commu-
nication.2 2
VI. CONCLUSION
A court can protect the First Amendment rights of anti-abortion pro-
testers and a woman's right to an abortion without compromise. 27 3 In
order to stop the senseless violence that sometimes accompanies expres-
sion by anti-abortion protesters, an aggrieved party can utilize one of
several statutes available to victims of anti-abortion violence.2' These
statutes punish the wrongdoers for engaging in violence, yet permit law
abiding pro-life activists to exercise their freedom of speech.1
5
When a court attempts to silence speech, it should be careful in issu-
ing or upholding a speech-restricting injunction because of its dangerous
implications.27 Unfortunately, the Court in Madsen adopted a standard
Health Center Abortion Protest Case, CHJmSTiANrry TODAY, June 1994, at 48.
270. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct at 2538-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). In addition to producing the chilling effect, a speech-re-
stricting injunction is a powerful weapon in the hands of judges who may want to
suppress a particular viewpoint either because of their own beliefs or because of the
unpopularity of the targeted group's views. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
271. Id. at 2527. One author claimed that the Madsen decision infringes only on the
manner in which pro-life groups may demonstrate, not their message. Fay Clayton &
Frona C. Daskal, Buffer Zone Protects a Basic Right... But Does It Rob Us of
Another One?, CHICAGO TRm., July 28, 1994, at 19.
272. See supra notes 266-70 (discussing the chilling effect of suppressing legal pro-
tests).
273. See Joy Hollingsworth McMurtry & Patti S. Pennock, Ending the Violence: Ap-
plying the Ku Klux Klan Act, RICO, and FACE to the Abortion Controversy, 30
LAND & WATER L. REV. 203, 229 (1995).
274. Id. at 207-08. Federal legislation such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) and the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)
has been employed in attempting to reduce the spread of violence at abortion clinics.
Id. at 211-13.
275. See generally id. at 211-13.
276. See Madsen, 114 S. CL at 2538-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
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that it claims is somewhat stricter than intermediate scrutiny, but when
applied does not differ significantly from the intermediate standard used
in analyzing content-neutral statutes .2 " The decision in Madsen has giv-
en judges great leeway in restricting free speech.
As the Framers of the Constitution anticipated, individuals need a
mechanism to build coalitions and effect change, even when voicing
unpopular opinions.278 The Court, with its decision in Madsen, has de-
termined that if conduct during a protest crosses legal boundaries, pro-
testers may have their First Amendment rights permanently impaired in
related future acts of protest, expression, and speech.
KELI N. OsAKI
part and dissenting in part).
277. See id. at 2544-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
278. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 12-2, at 788 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that freedom of speech is a "means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth" and "political change")).

